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What accounts for continuing authoritarian success in the Arab world 
today? In light of the “Arab Spring,” explanations of “authoritarian re-
silience” in the region clearly need to be revised. Yet it is important to 
remember that many of these authoritarian regimes have weathered the 
storm well. As Sean Yom and Gregory Gause recently noted in these 
pages, most of the region’s monarchies have so far remained unbowed 
by the winds of revolutionary change.1 It is much harder—though not 
impossible—to identify Arab republics that have not been deeply and 
adversely affected by the wave of uprisings. In the Republic of Algeria, 
not only did the regime survive this tumultuous period, but it hardly 
deviated from its habitual methods of authoritarian governance. Is Al-
geria the exception that confirms the rule? Or does it underscore the 
complexity of the mechanisms underpinning authoritarianism in the re-
gion, and the limitations of revolutionary models of regime change of 
the Arab Spring? In my view, Algeria illustrates a type of authoritarian 
resistance to popular challenges that is based on pseudodemocratization, 
redistributive patronage, and an effective use of the security apparatus.
It would be misguided to evaluate the prospects for political change 
in the Middle East simply in light of the recent uprisings. The patterns 
of democratic revolutions and authoritarian resilience observed during 
the Arab Spring indicate that specific combinations of factors can be 
conducive to regime failure, but they hardly provide a comprehensive 
map of all the causes that can lead to regime change in the region. For 
one thing, authoritarian elites do learn from their mistakes and those of 
others; in that respect, the Algerian regime is no exception.2 Further-
more, and somewhat counterintuitively, just because a particular regime 
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survived this wave of revolts does not mean that it is strong or stable 
in the full sense, but only that it was not vulnerable to the particular 
forms of mobilization that marked those uprisings. Here again, Algeria 
is a good illustration. Despite its unsteady mode of authoritarian gover-
nance, the Algerian regime currently possesses the means to cope with 
the difficulties presented by popular uprisings. Yet it cannot survive in 
its current form for long, given its dwindling legitimacy, its lack of truly 
institutionalized mechanisms for transferring power, and the intrinsic 
limits of its system of patronage.
How did Algeria reach this pass, and what does that tell us about au-
thoritarian resilience in the region today? Authoritarian stability during 
the Arab Spring was path-dependent and sprang from the combination 
of three sets of factors related, respectively, to institutions, the socioeco-
nomic situation, and the security services. If an authoritarian regime sur-
vives mass protests, it does so because its mechanisms for decoupling so-
cial unrest from political mobilization—namely, pseudodemocratization, 
state patronage, and robust militarism—are effective. The authoritarian 
rulers prop themselves up with the help of a pseudodemocratic multi-
party system that coopts and divides the opposition while generating a 
modicum of international recognition. They also entrench a patronage-
based rentier economy that, in effect, buys social quiet with financial 
rewards. Finally, the well-resourced repressive apparatus is both willing 
and able to put down social unrest and armed rebellions. 
A Hijacked Transition
What makes the case of Algeria during the Arab Spring all the more 
puzzling is that, compared to its North African neighbors (Morocco, Tu-
nisia, Libya, and Egypt), it had long been a troubled polity where social 
order remained elusive. Colonized by France in the nineteenth century, 
Algeria won independence in 1962 after a deadly eight-year war. The 
National Liberation Front (FLN) had led the fight for independence, 
and afterward formed a one-party state. The National Liberation Army 
would repeatedly impose its choices on the FLN after the military coup 
of Colonel Houari Boumediene in 1965. After severe rioting and social 
unrest in 1988, the government introduced a series of political and eco-
nomic reforms, and the country held multiparty local elections in 1990 
and the first round of national parliamentary elections in late 1991. 
This first attempt at democratization saw an Islamic constituency mo-
bilize and come close to gaining state power—until the electoral gains 
of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) were wiped out by the military 
coup of January 1992. The fallout from this ill-fated move was nearly 
a decade of civil conflict between the military-backed regime and the 
newly created Armed Islamic Groups. It engulfed ordinary Algerians in 
a vicious cycle of brutality and retribution that claimed around 150,000 
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lives. Although the general armistice that marked the end of the Islamist 
insurrection in 1999 reduced the fighting to a level that was manageable 
for the government of newly elected President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (b. 
1937) of the FLN, residual violence has continued to plague the coun-
try—most notably due to the activities of the Salafist Group for Preach-
ing and Combat, an organization that in 2007 rebranded itself al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb.
A principal consequence of the civil conflict was a fragmented politi-
cal community in which nationalists, secularists, liberals, and Islamists 
distrusted each other as much as they distrusted the regime. Although the 
state had reclaimed a degree of legitimacy through the reestablishment 
of a (rather unrepresentative) parliamentary system, the regime had also 
been rocked by powerful social and political protests. The Berber “Black 
Spring” of 2001, in which more than a hundred demonstrators in the 
Kabylie region were killed while protesting against the regime’s policies 
toward Berbers, showed how continuing failures of political dialogue—
this time with Kabyle social movements—and heavy-handed repressive 
tactics ensured an atmosphere of mutual distrust in the country. 
Algeria’s electoral system—which lacked credibility despite praise 
from the international community for the regime’s democratic reforms—
did little to change these perceptions. Backed by the military, Bouteflika 
won the presidency unopposed in 1999. The other six candidates had 
withdrawn from the contest on the eve of the election, claiming that it 
was rigged. Bouteflika went on to win the 2004 and 2009 elections with 
84 percent and 90 percent of the vote, respectively. (He was allowed 
to run in 2009 only after a constitutional amendment permitted him 
a third term.) Bouteflika’s administration has been careful to include 
the Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society (MSP) and the National 
Democratic Rally (RND; a party founded in 1997 by entrenched elites 
who backed the then-president, retired general Liamine Zeroual) in the 
governing coalition in order to widen its support base. Yet the token 
Islamist participation of the MSP, former competitors of the FIS, is not 
an indication of a substantive political opening; rather, it shows how the 
regime uses cooptation and patronage.
During the 2000s, the socioeconomic climate in Algeria remained 
harsh despite state subsidies and infrastructural investments paid for by 
oil and gas rents. In a leaked 2008 cable, U.S. ambassador Robert Ford 
told Washington that Algerians were striking nearly every week and 
that “almost daily there are isolated demonstrations, with the occasional 
government office in some distant town attacked.”3 In the year before 
the Arab Spring, Algerian newspapers regularly reported episodes of 
rioting in various parts of the country. Yet by the end of 2010, if the 
Algerian regime was not proving to be as solidly in control as its neigh-
bors seemed to be, neither did it appear to be on the brink of collapse. 
Crucially, most Algerians did not consider the aging and increasingly 
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incapacitated Bouteflika to be the main driver of the country’s predatory 
regime, and therefore did not think that ousting him would dramatically 
improve their lives. Moreover, the partial political opening that the re-
gime had orchestrated kept the dissensions within the opposition alive 
while giving many a stake in the status quo.
Missing the Revolutionary Bandwagon
At the beginning of 2011, Algeria was one of the first countries in 
the region to be affected by the wave of uprisings that had begun in Tu-
nisia as 2010 ended. In Algeria, a deregulation of the state-subsidized 
economy triggered price hikes and shortages just as Algerians could see 
unrest reaching a crisis next door in Tunisia. Protests broke out in sev-
eral of the poorer suburbs of Algiers and Oran on January 3. By the next 
day, rioting had spread to other areas near the capital. On January 5, there 
was major unrest in Algiers, Oran, and many other towns all around the 
country. Algeria’s relatively free press covered the events, and soon riots 
were reported in twenty regions (wilayat). As the rioters—mainly young 
men—blocked roads, burned tires, and ransacked government buildings 
and commercial centers, the initial discontent over a decrease in subsi-
dized staple goods gave way to protests over a wide range of socioeco-
nomic grievances.
The shadow of the October 1988 riots loomed over these events, and 
the connection was explicitly made in the domestic press. While the so-
cioeconomic complaints did resemble those of 1988, the roles of the mil-
itary and the Islamists were different. Although former FIS leader Ali 
Belhadj and his supporters turned up at the demonstrations in Algiers, 
Islamists did not lead the protest or even turn out in large numbers. Like-
wise, the response of the security forces was nowhere near as brutal or 
lethal as it had been in 1988, when the army fired live ammunition at the 
crowds. In January 2011, by contrast, the security forces targeted key ur-
ban areas—in central Algiers around the Parliament, the Senate, and other 
government buildings—and simply abandoned the suburbs to the rioters. 
A few days after the riots began, the government announced a rever-
sal of the price increases and put in place new policies designed to lower 
the cost of food imports. This swift action appeared to meet the protest-
ers’ demands. Within a couple of days, most protests had subsided and 
mass public disobedience was losing momentum. Moreover, the relative 
restraint of the security forces ensured that state repression itself did not 
become the cause of further protests (as had happened in Tunisia). In 
this context of subsiding revolutionary fervor, even radical acts, such 
as a self-immolation on January 12, failed to reignite the contestation.4
During the Arab Spring, popular unrest and regime responses in Al-
geria ended up following rather predictable patterns and thus strength-
ened preexisting dynamics of state-society interactions. This does not 
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mean that the Algerian regime used the “correct” combination of re-
pression and cooptation to defuse a revolution, but merely that on this 
occasion what it did worked well enough. In 2011, popular unrest did 
not gather enough momentum to deinstitutionalize routine authoritar-
ian practices and induce a reframing of the roles of the regime and the 
protesters. In the ensuing months, however, “normalcy” in Algeria still 
included regular protests—clashes with police, road blockades, strikes, 
ransacking of buildings, and so on—but these were disparate episodes 
rather than part of a nationwide event.
In the aftermath of the riots, however, a group of social and political 
organizations started a new and far less spectacular protest movement. 
On January 20, several opposition parties, nonlegalized unions, and civ-
il society organizations joined forces to articulate the implicit political 
demands of the protesting crowds. These groups formed the National 
Coordination for Change and Democracy (NCCD) and issued a call for 
greater democracy, social justice, an end to the state of emergency, re-
laxation of media laws, and the release of imprisoned protesters, as well 
as more job opportunities. 
As the movement signaled its intention to organize a demonstration 
against the regime, its call for public protest was swiftly echoed by the 
pro-Islamist activist network Rachad. Soon after, Sa¦d Saadi, the leader 
of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), a Berber political party, 
announced that the RCD was organizing a march for democracy in Al-
giers on January 22. The demonstration, which gathered a few hundred 
activists in central Algiers, was quickly broken up by a large police 
force that also prevented busloads of activists from entering the city to 
join the protest. In its turn, the NCCD announced that it would organize 
its own march on February 12. The regime made good use of the lull be-
tween the two protests to ease socioeconomic and political tensions. On 
February 3, the government indicated that the nineteen-year-old state of 
emergency would soon be lifted, opposition parties would be allowed 
greater airtime on state-controlled television and radio, and a new job-
creation scheme was about to be implemented.
On 12 February 2011—the day after Egyptian president Hosni 
Mubarak resigned—protestors in Algeria responding to the NCCD’s call 
converged on May First Square in central Algiers. In an event that some 
viewed as a miniature version of Cairo’s Tahrir Square protests, around 
three-thousand protesters managed to occupy the square for a while after 
breaking through police lines. Yet in Algiers, unlike in Cairo, security 
forces outnumbered protesters by ten to one; about thirty-thousand po-
lice had been mobilized for the occasion. Riot police blocked would-be 
protesters from neighboring suburbs and other towns from reaching the 
center of the capital to participate in the demonstration in May First 
Square. 
One incident in particular illustrated the NCCD’s difficulties at unify-
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ing the opposition: Former FIS leader Ali Belhadj and several dozen of 
his supporters were pushed back while trying to join the demonstration. 
The expulsion of Belhadj and his cohort was not the work of the police, 
however, but rather of the demonstrators themselves, who feared that the 
Islamists might hijack their protest. The impact of the 1992 military coup 
and the civil conflict on Islamic-secular relations is such that leftist and 
liberal actors prefer to go it alone against the regime at the risk of failure, 
rather than seek a potentially more powerful coalition with the Islamists. 
The February 12 demonstration illustrated the limited capabilities of 
the NCCD to unite different opposition forces in the country and to con-
nect with the large number of depoliticized youth who had driven Janu-
ary’s social protests. Undaunted, the NCCD called for demonstrations 
to continue every Saturday in May First Square. The following week, 
on February 19, a similar protest was duly organized, with the same 
disappointing turnout. The choice of Saturday for weekly demonstra-
tions—despite earlier calls by Islamic groups such as Rachad to hold 
the protests on Fridays—further entrenched the divide between liberal 
secularists and Islamists. The symbolic death knell for the NCCD was 
probably a March 7 rally in Algiers of tens of thousands of communal 
guards—local police auxiliaries that the regime had organized in the 
countryside to hinder the activities of Islamist guerrillas—demanding 
better pay and greater recognition for their role during the civil conflict. 
This rally mobilized far more protesters than the NCCD ever had and 
temporarily disrupted police control of central Algiers. It illustrated that 
even a well-oiled security apparatus could be outfoxed, as long as pro-
testers had the numbers and surprise on their side.
Patronage and Militarism
Comparing Algeria to Tunisia, Jack Brown observed how counterin-
tuitive it was that Algerian civil society had not done a better job of har-
nessing the momentum of the January 2011 riots for their February dem-
onstrations, since Algeria under Bouteflika had a freer and livelier civil 
and political society than Tunisia under Ben Ali.5 What the February po-
litical protests showed, however, is that this greater political space can 
actually be a hindrance to large-scale mobilization if opposition forces 
are powerful enough to turn out their core constituencies but too weak 
to attract support beyond them, not least because of an unwillingness to 
create cross-ideological alliances. The political unrest in February was 
far less significant in scope than the social unrest in January, when the 
motley crew of demonstrators could join in the protest for any reason. In 
February, protesters had to subscribe to a particular agenda to join the 
movement, which disempowered the crowds by dividing them into com-
peting factions. This same predicament prevailed throughout the 2000s 
and was most vividly illustrated by the Berber Black Spring of 2001.
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By March 2011, it was clear that the initial wave of Arab uprisings 
would not affect Algeria in the way that it had its eastern neighbors. In 
Algeria, the return to normalcy meant the routinization of discontent and 
disorder through semi-institutional mechanisms designed to render such 
displays of disaffection nonthreatening to 
the ruling elite. In March in Algiers, typical 
instances of social unrest included nearly 
two-hundred youths throwing stones and 
Molotov cocktails at the police, a crowd 
of several hundred protesters similarly at-
tacking the police and contractors headed 
to bulldoze a shantytown, and the like. That 
same month, socioeconomic discontent 
generated at least seventy strikes through-
out the country by professional associations 
and unions—from teachers to rail workers 
and doctors to court clerks. As Ali Chibani 
remarked at the time, the regime’s position of relative weakness “is well 
understood by Algerians who recognize that now is the time to obtain 
promotions and improve their working conditions and their social cir-
cumstances.”6 The dynamics of these strikes, which would remain com-
monplace throughout the year, illustrate the continuing relevance of the 
traditional social contract proposed by the Algerian regime: The adminis-
tration provides better socioeconomic conditions in exchange for continu-
ing (albeit grudging) political quiescence. 
In May 2011, in an effort to finance the concessions made to vari-
ous striking sectors, the Algerian government unveiled a revised bud-
get that increased public-sector spending by a massive 25 percent. This 
spending spree constituted an affordable short-term option for a regime 
seeking to buy its way out of trouble, Gulf-monarchy style. Yet, with 
an ever-expanding public sector—and a much larger population than in 
the Gulf—the Algerian state has burdened itself with a soaring wage bill 
that can only be paid as long as oil and natural-gas prices keep rising.7 
As Luis Martinez has noted, the regime’s ability to reorient system-
challenging unrest into more mundane benefit-seeking protests stems 
from the economic system, which has been modeled over the years to 
buttress the patronage structures that ensure dependence of the popula-
tion and local elites on the state elite’s redistribution of oil and gas rents. 
In 2010, these rents “accounted for 60 percent of [Algeria’s] budget 
revenues, 36 percent of its GDP, and over 97 percent of its export earn-
ings.”8 This patronage system can expand and contract depending on 
the economic and political circumstances, and as the events of the late 
1980s and early 1990s illustrate, periods of contraction are costly for the 
regime. Tellingly, throughout the 2000s, the Bouteflika administration 
consistently and deliberately underestimated the price of oil and gas in 
Algeria’s patronage 
system can expand 
and contract depend-
ing on the economic 
and political circum-
stances, and periods 
of contraction are 
costly for the regime.
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its budget calculations so as to build large reserves of foreign currency 
that could be used precisely at times when the regime needed to counter 
dissent with financial incentives.
In addition to the support that it derives from the patronage system, 
the regime also owes its resilience to the backing of the security forces, 
as the 2011 protests illustrated. This is not to be understood simply in 
terms of the sheer repressive capability of the state, impressive though it 
is—the police and the gendarmerie were bolstered during the civil con-
flict of the 1990s, and by the end of the 2000s they numbered more than 
200,000 all told. The strength of the security forces stems more from the 
effectiveness of their response to the unrest. In that respect, the repres-
sive apparatus of January 2011 was far superior to that of October 1988, 
when the army killed more than five-hundred demonstrators in just over 
ten days. During the week of rioting in January 2011, only three dem-
onstrators died. In addition, at the end of February 2011, the govern-
ment lifted the state of emergency that had been in place since the 1992 
military coup. This symbolic concession was counterbalanced, however, 
by the adoption of new “antiterrorism” measures granting the security 
forces extensive freedom of action with regard to any matter that they 
deemed “a threat to the nation”—demonstrations in the capital included.
Some analyses of “robust” authoritarianism in the Middle East note 
that, in addition to the actual repressive capabilities of the security forces, 
two other aspects of repression are crucial to authoritarian rule: The first 
is the willingness of the military leadership (and other key security ac-
tors) to use force, and the second is the material and ideational interests 
of the military and other key security forces.9 For the Algerian military, 
these material interests have included not only a budget that has increased 
yearly during the 2000s in order to sustain existing levels of patronage, 
but also a more direct interest in various public and private-sector ven-
tures. Steven Cook likened the 1980s-era generals to “godfathers” who 
intervened in the delivery of business licenses and exclusivity contracts.10 
The 2000s, meanwhile, have seen the ongoing involvement of military 
figures in crony capitalism and corruption scandals—most spectacularly 
in relation to the national oil company, Sonatrach, in early 2010.11 
The rank-and-file security personnel have benefited, too. In Decem-
ber 2010, the government announced that the wages of most police 
forces—totaling 170,000 personnel—were to increase by 50 percent 
and would include a three-year back-pay deal. Similarly, in December 
2011 military personnel saw their salaries go up by 40 percent, also with 
a three-year back-pay package. Unmistakably, the postcolonial social 
contract of socioeconomic gratification in exchange for quiescence ap-
plied even more to rank-and-file members of the security apparatus than 
it did to the populace at large. 
Over the years, the upper ranks of the Algerian military have repeat-
edly proved willing and able to use lethal force on a massive scale to 
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secure their preferred system of political governance. This pattern of in-
tervention—and the belief of many junior officers that their oversight of 
politics is good for the country—has entrenched a neopraetorianism that 
leaves little chance for a protest-induced regime-change scenario in which 
the military stands by and lets a revolt run its course.12 Specialists have 
been predicting for years that the military would progressively lose influ-
ence—not least due to the dying off of the older generation of leaders—
but this has not yet translated into significant institutional and behavioral 
changes. In the current international and sociohistorical context, it seems 
unavoidable that the military’s influence will wane over time; the Turk-
ish model and some steps taken by the Egyptian military illustrate such 
trends. In the short term, however, the neopraetorian dynamics in Algeria 
constrain the kinds of political changes that are likely to occur. The vi-
cious circle created between low mobilization and low-cost repression is 
self-reinforcing. In addition, the population’s weariness of conflict since 
the 1990s contributes to the perception that, even if a revolt were to suc-
ceed, it could generate more unwanted violence and misery.
Authoritarian Upgrading After the Revolts
In April 2011, President Bouteflika went on national television to tout 
his Arab Spring–inspired program of reforms. The president announced 
“political reforms to deepen the democratic process and to enable the 
citizens to better contribute to the choices that shape their future.”13 In 
practice, however, this initiative resulted only in the establishment of a 
commission to organize limited constitutional reforms, broader access 
to national television and radio for opposition parties, and a revision of 
the electoral code to facilitate the creation of new political organiza-
tions. The underwhelmed response of the main opposition parties and 
civil society organizations to these propositions was reflected in their 
decision to boycott the consultation process of the committee charged 
with drafting the constitutional amendments the following month.
In an effort to show that the electoral reforms had substance, the Interior 
Minister Daho Ould Kablia eagerly announced at the start of October 2011 
that all new parties applying for recognition would be legalized before the 
end of the year. In practice, however, the proliferation of microparties—
nearly doubling the number of existing political parties from 22 to 40—
merely enabled the expansion of the regime’s patronage network via busi-
ness politics. Most of the new parties were either splinter groups of existing 
parties—especially the FLN and the RND—or vehicles for self-promotion 
by personalities and businessmen close to the regime.14
The electoral victories of Islamist parties in Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Egypt raised some international observers’ concerns about an Islamist 
resurgence in Algeria’s 10 May 2012 elections for the National People’s 
Assembly (the lower house of Parliament). Lending credence to these 
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fears was the MSP’s withdrawal from the ruling coalition in January 
2012 in order to join forces with two smaller Islamist opposition groups, 
Islah and Ennahda, to form the Green Algeria Alliance. Algerians, how-
ever, were skeptical of the credentials of this new Islamist alliance, 
which was dominated by political actors with a long history of cooper-
ating with the regime—even during the unrest in 2011—and who only 
moved to the opposition during the run-up to the elections. Moreover, 
the regime reaffirmed its policy of containing the Islamist vote with leg-
islative amendments that prohibited political actors previously associ-
ated with the FIS from creating new parties. In this context, as seasoned 
analysts of Algeria had predicted and as the regime had planned, the 
parliamentary elections brought few surprises.15 
Most of the new parties struggled to win just 1 or 2 percent of the 
vote, and none—not even the vaunted Green Algeria Alliance, which 
stayed stuck in single digits and won only 49 of 462 seats—emerged as a 
significant opposition force. If anything, the regime’s tinkering with the 
electoral rules may have been too effective for its own good. Although 
the country’s proportional-representation, largest-remainder system 
with a 5 percent threshold for earning seats remained intact, having so 
many opposition parties compete considerably boosted the FLN’s elec-
toral performance. The ruling party won 45 percent (208) of the seats in 
the Assembly—an outcome that was all the more remarkable given that 
the FLN received only a little over 17 percent of the vote. The RND, 
also a member of the ruling coalition, was the next-highest seat earner 
with 69. The Front of Socialist Forces and the Workers’ Party won 27 
and 24 seats, respectively. The remaining seats were divided among in-
dependent candidates and more than twenty other parties.16 
Internationally, the stability of Algeria’s pseudodemocratic system 
was once again commended. The elections were “a welcome step in 
Algeria’s progress toward democratic reform,” said U.S. secretary of 
state Hillary Clinton.17 Domestically, the election results generated the 
usual level of suspicion and incredulity from the Algerian public and 
political actors, and accusations of vote rigging and manipulation flew. 
In short, by encouraging an explosion of tiny new parties in an attempt 
to make the political field appear more pluralistic, the regime in fact 
(re)produced an ultradominant-party system. Yet in the new post–Arab 
Spring regional context, such authoritarian maintenance of the status 
quo suddenly appeared abnormal.18
The patron-client economic programs that the regime had devised in 
the run-up to the 2012 local and parliamentary elections helped to mo-
bilize those voters who would directly benefit from these subsidies. The 
show of electoral strength by the pro-regime parties (FLN and RND) 
was akin to the mass demonstrations of public support that the state par-
ty organized in the 1960s and the 1970s. Indeed, since the 1992 military 
intervention, elections have always swung massively (and suspiciously) 
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in favor of candidates and parties representing the incumbent leadership. 
At the same time, this system of political patronage generates constant 
infighting in and among regime-aligned parties, as different networks 
try to maximize their gains and leverage vis-`a-vis the central adminis-
tration. In Algeria, the flurry of political activity leading up to the 2014 
presidential election should not obscure the limited political opportuni-
ties that the country’s electoral model allows. As long as the ruling elite 
makes sure to keep power within its ranks, it will be able to manage a 
smooth transition, and the state-party system and its pseudodemocratic 
successor will remain mere tools for this rotation of power. 
Thus, who better to replace the current president in the forthcoming 
election than someone just like him? Who better to sit at the head of 
state than a longtime member of the ruling elite who knows how not to 
upset a system that works (at least for members of the elite)? The presi-
dential election scheduled for April 2014 presents an opportunity for 
the regime to ease into office someone ostensibly new, but who would 
not upset the status quo in any significant way. Unsurprisingly, in the 
first half of 2013 the most touted potential replacements for Bouteflika 
are all well known to both the regime and the electorate—FLN secre-
tary-general Abdelaziz Belkhadem, current prime minister Abdelmalek 
Sellal, and former prime ministers Ahmed Ouyahia, Ahmed Benbitour, 
Mouloud Hamrouche, and Ali Benflis. 
As for the Islamists, will they eventually be able to mount a success-
ful, institutionalized political challenge to obtain at least a share of state 
power, as has happened elsewhere in the region? For now, that seems 
an unlikely possibility in Algeria, even if we take into consideration 
the foothold inside ruling circles of former public-works minister Amar 
Ghoul, formerly of the MSP. Indeed, both Islamist and liberal opposi-
tion forces are still searching for a new kind of leadership and organiza-
tion that will enable them to mount a convincing challenge to the ruling 
elites, either on their own or as part of a yet-to-be-imagined grand co-
alition. It is doubtful that will happen in time for the 2014 presidential 
election, but it is bound to happen at some point. When it finally does, 
the dynamics of authoritarianism in Algeria—patronage, neopraetorian-
ism, and all—will change significantly.
NOTES
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